Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 45
Number 1 Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol 45,
Number 1

Article 5

1966

The Narrow Waters Strategies of Pedro Menendez
Paul E. Hoffman

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Hoffman, Paul E. (1966) "The Narrow Waters Strategies of Pedro Menendez," Florida Historical Quarterly:
Vol. 45 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol45/iss1/5

Hoffman: The Narrow Waters Strategies of Pedro Menendez

THE NARROW WATERS STRATEGIES
OF PEDRO MENENDEZ
by P AUL E. H OFFMAN

I

to Philip II from Cadiz on December 3, 1570,
Pedro Menendez de Aviles, Adelantado of Florida and Captain
General of the Armada for the Guarding and Security of the
Coasts, Islands, and Ports of the Indies, said that he planned to
“place myself in the Bahama Channel where he [Jacques Sores,
considered to be one of the best French corsairs and at the time
at large in the Caribbean] could not come out without my seeing
him.” 1 Menendez recognized that the control of the Bahama
Channel was essential for the security of the Caribbean. He said
that he was afraid that Sores would “make himself ruler of
Havana and Florida, so as to be able to commit his criminal acts
2
with greater safety.” This recognition was the basis of Menendez’s development of a strategy for the control of large areas of
the sea by means of the control of a strategic narrow-water
passage.
As Menendez developed this idea during the next four years,
it became a set of strategic principles. When first advanced in
1570, they lacked precise formulation. By 1574, however, they
were clearly worked out, as is demonstrated by his application
of them to the similar situation in the English Channel. Because
these principles are “modern” and so distinct from all other ideas
advanced before 1570 for the defense of the Caribbean against
corsairs, they deserve attention and a study of their possible
origins.
The recognition that the Bahama Channel was a bottleneck
which exposed ships to capture was made at least as early as
the transfer of the official sailing route to that waterway in
N A LETTER

1. Pedro Menendez to Philip II, December 3, 1570, “Letters of Pedro
Menendez de Aviles and Other Documents Relative to His Career,
1555-1574,” translated by Edward W. Lawson, 2 vols., (unpublished
Mss., 1955), 31, 400. Typescript in P. K. Yonge Library of Florida
History, Gainesville, Florida.
2. Ibid., 399.
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1541. 3 Nonetheless, the advantages which the channel’s winds
and currents conferred on ships seeking to leave the Caribbean
against the northeast trade winds were so great that the corsair
problem was assumed as a necessary evil. The corsairs quickly
made the channel and its key port, Havanna, a favorite hunting
ground for fat naos loaded with specie and such agricultural
exports as the American possessions of Spain provided.
Until 1565, the corsair problem in the channel had been
handled by convoying and an occasional patrol. In June 1564,
a more serious threat than any previously known in the channel
appeared in the form of Rene Laudonniere’s colony at Fort Caroline. According to Menendez’s report, based on interviews of
prisoners taken in the capture of Fort Caroline, Jean Ribault
planned in January of 1566 to take 800 men and seize and
fortify “a very handsome port they say they have examined,” in
the Martyrs (Florida Keys). Six galleys were to be stationed
there to intercept shipping as it came through the channel. That
summer (1566), Ribault had hoped to take Havana and free
the Negro slaves there. Next, the French planned to build a
fort at the Bay of Juan Ponce, that would provide them with
a base for attacks on New Spain, Honduras, and Yucatan. 4 How
much of this plan was known to Menendez and Philip II before
the former sailed from Spain is not known. Even without these
details, there was enough information available to the Spanish
for them to conclude that a corsair base was being built on the
lifeline of the empire. That belief formed the basis for Menendez’s execution of the French he found in Florida. 5
These French plans are the single most prominent source
from which Menendez could have drawn his ideas of 1570. His
concepts of 1570 are original, however, in that he planned to
cruise in the channel at all times in galeones of his own design,
3. Irene A. Wright, Historia documentada de San Cristobal de la Hab a n a , 2 vols. (Havana, 1927), I, 14.
4. Menendez to Philip II, October 15, 1565, “Letters of Menendez,” I,
229-43b.
5. Woodbury Lowery, Spanish Settlements within the Present Limits of
the United States: Florida 1562-1574, 2 vols. (New York, 1959
edition), II, 120-207 passim, acknowledges that this was the belief
of the Spanish, but fails to recognize that it is sufficient to explain
Menendez’s actions when his instructions from 1562 respecting corsairs are taken into consideration. See Philip II to Menendez, January 23, 1562, “Letters of Menendez,” I, 78-79. The religious motives
and problems of military expediency are simply icing on this cake.
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only taking shelter in Havana or a Florida port during stormy
weather. 6 Ribault had apparently planned to use watch towers
and only row out when a fleet appeared. Menendez’s plans also
differed in that he planned to have eight fragatas in service as
a cruising squadron throughout the Antilles, thereby cutting off
the other passages through which corsairs were likely to try to
escape. 7 Finally, Menendez seems to have recognized that the
control of this one passage through which the corsairs had to
return to Europe would be enough over a period of time to discourage their coming to the Indies: “It is necessary to tie up
the passages on them, so that they cannot get out with a thing
they have captured, and thus make them break the thread of
the design they have to come and rob the Indies.” 8 In modern
terms, Menendez was placing his battleships in the Bahama
Channel where he would expect the largest number of enemy
efforts to get through. Fast, light cruisers were to patrol the
minor exits (Windward and Mona Passages) and coastal waters.
At least in theory there should have been no problems in
operating and supplying such a program of naval operations. The
Spanish controlled all the land near the seas in question. The
cruising squadrons would thus never be far from a port and
supplies. In fact, however, the supply problem was so acute for
Menendez that it seems to have prevented his system from ever
being tried. He could not even get the guns he needed for the
fragatas.
Other possible sources for Menendez’s ideas of using a cruising squadron to control a strategic passage may have been the
English or some of his Spanish contemporaries. From 15521559, he was in extensive contact with some of the foremost
sailors of England. 9 Their long experience with the control of
the Narrow Seas involved similar ideas. These may well have
been discussed over the after-dinner wine. Contemporary Spanish
experience in the Straits of Gibraltar with the Turkish corsairs may have given some of them similar ideas, though the
geographic situation was not really similar to that of the Carib6. Menendez to Philip II, December 3, 1570, “Letters of Menendez,” II,
400.
7. Menendez t o P h i l i p II, July 22, 1571, ibid., 438.
8. Ibid.
9 . Menendez to Philip I I , 1561 ( ? ) , 1 5 6 4 ( ? ) , ibid., I , 52-57.
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bean. It is also possible, but unlikely from evidence known to
the author, that Spaniards residing in the Indies had thought
enough about the problem of defense and Caribbean geography
to reach conclusions to which Menendez might have been privy.
Certainly they knew enough about the geography of the area
and the capabilities of their ships that they could have made a
correct guess.
Although Menendez did not have any opportunity to put
his plan into effect in the Indies, he polished it and tried again
in 1574 when he advanced it in an effort to dissuade Philip from
forcing him to sail under orders he correctly judged would be
disasterous, as similar orders were fourteen years later for the
Armada. In a letter of August 15, Menendez stated his plan.
Apparently worked out and discussed with Philip’s top advisors,
and previously mentioned to the king in person, the plan called
for the use of an armada as a patrolling squadron that winter
between Ushant and the Scilly Isles (its base). This patrol would
be able to intercept corsairs coming out of or returning to the
channel. It would keep England’s fleet (the royal fleet) mobilized and would prevent the Dutch rebels (the Sea Beggers) from
dispersing their fleet along the Flanders coast because they would
have to be on guard in case Menendez should suddenly sweep
down on them. This plan would also allow time for the gathering
of supplies at Santander and Bilbao of the correct quantity and
quality for an expedition to Flanders, something which had not
been done and was not likely to be accomplished by the time
Philip wanted Menendez to sail. Finally, this winter patrol
would keep the Indies free of additional corsairs by preventing
their leaving Europe. 1 0 Then in the spring, under secret orders,
twenty shallow draft galeotas could be built. This, with the
previous winter’s damage to the English and rebel fleets, would
give Spain numerical superiority in the channel that summer.
These boats would, with some of the Scilly Isles fleet, serve as a
10. John H. Parry, A Short History of the West Indies (London, 1963),
37. Parry views the 1574 plan as “only part of an over-all
plan. . . .” My reading of the documents leads me to conclude that
while Menendez did recognize that “all seas are one,” he did not
advance the 1574 plan as part of a plan to defend the Indies. His
reference to the Indies is simply an additional reason thrown into
the pot in hopes Philip would listen to reason. The problem in 1574
was how to avoid disaster on the Flanders Banks, not how to defend
the Indies.
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second fleet off Flanders to engage the rebels. Menendez’s Scilly
Isles fleet would continue its patrol and sweep down to the northern coast of Spain for refitting during the summer. It would
also guard the communications of the Flanders fleet, something
for which Philip was making no provision. 11
As Menendez saw them, the operations of these two fleets
would allow Spain to stop the trade of England, Normandy,
Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, and Germany (the Hanse) if she
desired, while causing Queen Elizabeth to spend money in keeping her fleet in order, but not in action, and provide a way to
deal with the Dutch rebels in a logistically sound fashion. 12 In
short, Spain could become mistress of the seas. This idea was
in strong disagreement with the orders Menendez had from
Philip.
The basic strategic principles of this plan are those of the
plan of 1570-1571 for naval operations in the Bahama Channel
and the Antilles. Like that plan, this one for the English Channel
makes maximum use of a cruising fleet holding a strategic passage
while auxiliary fleets performed lesser tasks. Both plans show
a sound grasp of the logistical problems of keeping a fleet at sea
and conducting distant operations. Both are a neat balance between a concentration of forces and their dispersal. The 1574
plan, as the more clearly enunciated of the two, is strikingly
modern in strategy. It was, in fact, at least thirty or more years
“ahead of its time.” The principles of strategy behind it are those
Nelson was to use so sucessfully 250 years later.
Unfortunately for Spain, the political situation in Flanders
and England ameliorated enough so that Menendez’s sudden
death on September 17, 1574, was sufficient reason to disband
the fleet. Had the fleet sailed as ordered by Philip, its fate might
have been that of the Armada of 1588. On the other hand it
might have changed the political history of Europe by destroying
the Dutch rebels. From the Spanish point of view, the latter
would have been a real boon.
In summary, it may be said that Pedro Menendez drew from
a commonly-held recognition of an important bottleneck to maritime commerce, the ideas of the French corsairs under Ribault,
11. Menendez to Philip II, August 15, 1574, “Letters of Menendez,” II,
505-06.
12. Ibid., 506, 508.
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his knowledge of the Caribbean and of ships, and possibly the
experience of the English or his Spanish contemporaries to
fashion a modern set of strategic principles for securing control
of the Caribbean and the geographically similar English ChannelNorth Sea area. In both cases, his genius recognized the strategic
possibilities of the narrow waters. This recognition was unique
among his contemporaries.
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